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Disclosure of Banks’ Stress-Test Results
Summary
The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the Federal Reserve conduct an annual stress test on large bank holding
companies (BHCs) to ensure they have sufficient capital to withstand losses from adverse economic
conditions. Eighteen BHCs were subjected to a stress test this year. The stress tests operate on the
assumption that providing more information will help impose more discipline on financial institutions.
However, the policy of disclosure has some significant disadvantages that need to be addressed in order
for financial regulation to be effective.
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Disclosure of Banks’
Stress-Test Results
Itay Goldstein
One of the main lessons of the recent financial crisis is that large
banks need to have sufficient capital to absorb losses resulting
from adverse economic conditions.
This is especially important for preventing the negative spillovers that these losses
can have on the rest of the economy via
contagion across financial institutions
and the reduction in loans to the real
economy. Consequently, the United States
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which requires
the Federal Reserve to conduct an annual
stress test of large bank holding companies
(BHCs) to evaluate whether they indeed
have sufficient capital.
Examinations of large banks by regulators are not new. Large banks in the United
States have been subject to continuous
on-site examinations for many years, and
these on-site examinations have been a key
input into a bank’s CAMELS rating, which
is a score between 1 and 5 used to classify a
bank’s overall condition. The newly required
stress tests are different in that they focus

on the ability of banks to withstand
severely adverse macroeconomic scenarios.
Moreover, their results are intended to be
disclosed publicly.
The results of the most recent stress
tests were disclosed publicly in March
2013.1 The disclosure of the results is an
important part of the newly required stress
tests in the eyes of the Federal Reserve, as
emphasized in the press release announcing
the results: “The Federal Reserve believes
that disclosure of stress test results provides
valuable information to market participants
and the public, enhances transparency, and
promotes market discipline.”2 At the same
time, this disclosure policy is quite controversial and has generated strong concerns in
the financial industry. For example, in a Wall
Street Journal article from March 5, 2012,
the Clearing House Association expressed
the view that making all this information public “could have unanticipated and
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potentially unwarranted and negative consequences to covered companies and U.S.
financial markets.” In this policy brief, I will
outline some of these potentially unwarranted and negative consequences, which
I believe are indeed important to consider
when designing disclosure policy.
The structure of this policy brief is as
follows: First, I provide a short overview of
the nature of the newly required stress tests
and the meaning of their results. Then, I
discuss the tradeoffs involved in setting the
level of disclosure, emphasizing some of the
disadvantages of a policy of greater disclosure, which are often not well understood.
Finally, I conclude with a few suggestions
on how to revise the disclosure policy to
alleviate some of the identified problems. As
I explain below, understanding the implications of the disclosure policy is crucial for
alleviating financial fragility, for providing
proper incentives to banks, and for enabling
efficient production and aggregation of
information about financial institutions.

Stress Tests following
the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal
Reserve to conduct an annual stress test
on large BHCs and all nonbank financial
companies designated by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for
Federal Reserve supervision. The Federal
Reserve adopted rules implementing these
requirements in October 2012. Under the
rules, 18 BHCs were part of the DoddFrank Act supervisory stress tests this year
(DFAST 2013). They are: Ally Financial
Inc.; American Express Company; Bank
of America Corporation; The Bank of New
York Mellon Corporation; BB&T Corporation; Capital One Financial Corporation;
Citigroup, Inc.; Fifth Third Bancorp; The
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan
Chase & Co.; KeyCorp; Morgan Stanley;
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.;
Regions Financial Corporation; State Street
Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S.
1 		 They are available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
press/bcreg/20130307a.htm.
2 		 http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/executive-

Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company.
Their total assets range from $89 billion
(KeyCorp) to $2.4 trillion ( JPMorgan
Chase & Co) as of March 2013.
In conducting the stress tests, the
Federal Reserve considered three macroeconomic scenarios – baseline, adverse, and
severely adverse – and examined the implications they would have on each individual
BHC. The published results are for the
severely adverse economic scenario.
The severely adverse scenario includes
trajectories for 26 variables: 14 variables
that capture economic activity, asset prices,
and interest rates in the U.S. economy
and financial markets, plus three variables
(real GDP growth, inflation, and the U.S./
foreign currency exchange rate) in each of
four countries or country blocs (the euro
area, the United Kingdom, developing Asia,
and Japan). This scenario is not meant to
be a projection for the future, but rather a
reflection of a very bad possible economic
shock of the kind that was experienced in
the recent financial and economic crisis.
In this scenario, real GDP in the United
States declines nearly 5 percent between
the third quarter of 2012 and the end of
2013; the unemployment rate rises to 12
percent; the four-quarter percent change in
the consumer price index (CPI) decelerates
to 1 percent; equity prices fall more than 50
percent; the equity market volatility index
increases from 21 to 70; real estate prices
decline by more than 20 percent; and the
euro area, the United Kingdom, and Japan
fall into recession, while developing Asia
experiences below-trend growth.
For each BHC, the stress test examines
the effect of the severely adverse economic
shock on net income and losses, taking into
account the exposures of the BHC and its
business. In order to conduct this analysis,
the Federal Reserve relies on input from the
BHCs and on analytical models that determine the effect of the shock on the income
and losses of the bank. Combining the
results on income and losses with assumptions on capital distribution policy, the test

summary.htm.

generates the final output, which is the
effect of the severely adverse shock on the
bank’s capital ratios, based on different definitions of capital ratios. The four different
ratios are the ratio of the common equity
component of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted
assets (the tier 1 common ratio), the ratio
of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets (the
tier 1 capital ratio), the ratio of total regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (the
total risk-based capital ratio), and the ratio
of tier 1 capital to average assets (the tier 1
leverage ratio).
Generally speaking, when a bank’s
capital ratios are projected to drop below
a certain threshold following the severely
adverse economic shock, that bank is
considered to have not “passed” the stress
test. Such a bank is expected to limit
capital distributions or raise more capital
to be better prepared for adverse economic
shocks. In general, banks differ from each
other in the type of loans they make and
the exposures of these loans to the assumed
macroeconomic scenarios. Also, they differ in their capital buffers and how these
buffers are maintained in light of planned
capital distributions. Hence, some banks
may fail while others may pass depending
on these different business practices and
capital structures.
Overall, the newly required stress tests
are an important part of the post-crisis
regulatory effort to maintain a sound financial system that is less prone to the fragility
experienced in 2008. Constantly thinking
of adverse economic shocks and examining
whether large financial institutions have
sufficient capital to endure such shocks is a
very useful exercise to prevent the negative
spillovers from financial institutions’ losses
in bad times to the rest of the economy via
contagion across financial institutions and
the reduction in loans to the real economy.
While the current framework for the
stress tests is a very good first step, it has
its weaknesses. One major difficulty is that
the stress tests only consider three scenarios (focusing on the most adverse one).

edu/~itayg/Files/stresstests.pdf.

3 		 “Should Banks’ Stress Test Results Be Disclosed? An Analysis of the

4 		 For example, the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department

Costs and Benefits” (2012). Available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.

of the Treasury is coordinating efforts to analyze and improve stress

tests. Some work in this direction can be found in the OFR’s working
paper series: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/ofr/research/Pages/
working-paper-series.aspx.

These scenarios are heavily influenced by
past events, but as we know, future events
can take a wholly different form; there is
room to analyze many more scenarios than
just the three that are examined currently.
Considering a wider array of scenarios
that could emerge from recent economic
developments would improve the ability of the tests to identify weak spots in
the financial system. Another difficulty is
related to the ability to capture systemic
risks and general-equilibrium effects in the
current framework. As we saw in the recent
crisis, problems are aggravated by equilibrium forces, as the shocks to some institutions might bring down other institutions.
Developing a framework that captures the
combined effects on all banks, taking into
account their relations with each other and
with the rest of the economy, is a major
challenge that academics and policymakers
need to address in the years to come.
The focus of this policy brief, however,
is not on these general weaknesses in the
framework under which stress tests are
conducted, but on the important angle of
the disclosure of the results. I now turn to
discuss this issue.

to market participants enables the market
to prepare for the consequences of large
economic shocks, and this, in turn, disciplines financial institutions. For example,
if a financial institution is found to be
unprepared for a large economic shock, then
market participants will limit their exposure
to this financial institution. This will force
the financial institution to take actions to
improve its capital positions in order to
regain the confidence of market participants. The basic idea is that more information is always beneficial, as it allows market
participants to take more efficient decisions
in their interactions with financial institutions, and thus encourages greater discipline
among financial institutions.

The Tradeoffs Involved in
Designing the Disclosure
Policy

However, recent academic literature
has pointed out that disclosure has some
significant disadvantages. These can be particularly relevant in the case of banks’ stress
tests results. Such disadvantages are often
not fully understood and appreciated in the
debate on disclosure, and so it is important
to highlight and explain them. In a recent
paper that I co-authored with Haresh
Sapra, we review this literature, describing
in detail the disadvantages of disclosure and
their implications for the question of stress
test disclosure.3 Here, I draw on this review
to describe the main policy insights. The
interested reader can refer to this paper for
fuller analysis and a list of references.
Broadly speaking, the disadvantages
of disclosure can be classified into three
groups:

The last round of stress tests described
above involved a high level of disclosure
on each individual BHC. For each BHC,
the four projected capital ratios under the
severely adverse scenario were disclosed
publicly, alongside details on projected net
income and projected loan losses by type of
loan (First-lien mortgages, domestic; Junior
liens and HELOCs, domestic; Commercial and industrial; Commercial real estate,
domestic; Credit cards; Other consumer;
Other loans). Overall, the results suggest
that all BHCs, with the exception of Ally
Financial – the former finance affiliate of
General Motors, owned by the U.S. government since the financial crisis – have sufficient capital to endure the severely adverse
shock that served as the basis for the test.
The benefit of disclosure is very well
understood. Providing more information

“Disclosure has undeniable
benefits in promoting informativeness and market discipline. However, one should
be mindful of the unintended
consequences.”

I. Adverse Effects on the
Ex-Post Behavior of Market
Participants
If an individual market participant needs to

make a decision, this decision will be more
efficient when there is access to more information. This, however, is not necessarily the
case in the presence of many market participants that exert externalities on each other.
Market participants might put excessive
weight on public information, even if it is
less precise than their own private information, just because they know that the public
information is available to all of them.
Specifically, in the context of banks, a piece
of bad news that is made public via the disclosure of stress test results might trigger an
inefficient run on a bank that does not pass
the test. Market participants, knowing that
the negative results were observed by all,
will rush to withdraw money from the bank,
even if their own private information is not
so negative. Hence, the results of stress tests
that are made public might get more than
their fair weight in market participants’
decisions, generating adverse economic
outcomes. This problem is particularly
severe if the stress test results are noisy, e.g.,
if the data used in the stress test are not sufficiently rich to determine precisely the risk
faced by the bank, thus generating predictions that are not perfect.

II. Adverse Effects on the
Ex-Ante Behavior of Market
Participants
Stress tests conducted by the Federal
Reserve provide one source of information about banks. There are many other
sources of information that find their way
into financial markets. Generally speaking,
speculators in financial markets produce
and trade on information on banks; this
information finds its way into market prices.
This is why regulators are known to rely
on market prices of bank securities when
deciding on various policy steps. The problem is that when regulators disclose their
own information ex post by publishing stress
test results, they crowd out other sources
of information. This is because speculators’ incentives to produce information on
individual banks and trade on it might be
weakened when they know that some of
this information already is slated to find its
way to the markets via the disclosure made
by the Federal Reserve.

III. Adverse Effects on the
Ex-Ante Behavior of Financial
Institutions
Banks that know that their performance in
a stress test will become public information might adjust their behavior ex ante in
an inefficient way. Such inefficiencies may
come in different forms. For example, banks
may be reluctant to provide information to
the Federal Reserve if they know that this
information will become public. Since the
Federal Reserve depends on banks’ information for the stress tests, this could reduce
the precision and effectiveness of stress
tests. Banks also might try to ‘game’ the
system by adjusting their exposures in a way
that will enable them to pass the stress test
but will not necessarily make them less risky
or more efficient. This is related to the fact
that stress tests identify only a limited number of scenarios, so banks can learn how to
appear healthy in particular scenarios while
not minimizing overall risk or maximizing
overall value.

Implications for the
Disclosure of Stress
Tests Results
Should we conclude from the above discussion that disclosure of banks’ stress test
results is undesirable? The answer to this
question is simple: No. Disclosure has undeniable benefits in promoting informativeness
and market discipline. However, one should
be mindful of the unintended consequences
of disclosure, and perhaps limit the extent
of disclosure to mitigate these unintended
consequences.
For example, instead of disclosing
BHC-specific information, as described
above, another possibility is to disclose only
aggregate information—say, total expected
losses by loan type for a group of banks, or
average expected capital ratios for a group
of banks. Disclosing aggregate information
can help avoid the unintended consequences
highlighted in the previous section. Aggregate results are more precise and therefore
are less likely to trigger inefficient runs on
individual banks. The disclosure of aggregate results will not crowd out the incentives of speculators to produce and trade

on bank-specific information. And the fact
that aggregate results are disclosed will not
lead banks to restrict the information they
provide or to try to game the system. Of
course, disclosing only aggregate information has a cost, as it does not allow for the
benefits of microprudential regulation. Yet, it
allows the Federal Reserve to create benefits
for macroprudential regulation, i.e., regulation aimed to promote the stability of the
financial system as a whole—which, after all,
is the main motivation for having stress tests
in the first place.
But, there are also ways to disclose
bank-specific information and alleviate the
unintended consequences. To address the
possibility of runs following a bad result
for an individual bank, it is important to
identify the banks that are particularly
susceptible to runs – those with a severe
mismatch between liquid liabilities and
illiquid assets – and to be particularly cautious in disclosing information about them.
Moreover, accompanying the disclosure of
a bad performance on a stress test with a
clear plan on how to fix the problem and
improve the capital positions of the bank
will alleviate the concerns of the market and
make a run less likely. To avoid crowding out
information production by market participants, the Federal Reserve can identify the
dimensions on which the market is likely
to provide information of higher quality
than the regulatory stress tests and avoid
disclosing information on these dimensions.
To prevent incentive problems at the banks,
and to make sure that they don’t game the
system and adjust their balance sheets just
to pass the test, it is important that banks
don’t know ex ante what are the parameters
and assumptions on which the stress test
will focus. In particular, running multiple
scenarios will make it more difficult for
banks to do ‘window dressing’ in preparation
for a stress test.
Above all, improving the quality and
precision of the stress test will go a long way
in mitigating the unintended consequences
of disclosure. When very precise information is being disclosed, those problems are
less worrying. As mentioned above, two
ways to improve the quality and precision
of stress tests results would be to consider a

larger variety of economic scenarios and to
account for systemic risk and general-equilibrium effects. Current research conducted
in academia and in policy institutions is
aimed at improving stress tests analysis in
these dimensions and others.4 For example,
considering systemic risk and generalequilibrium effects requires understanding
the interconnections across banks and how
they are affected in times of crisis. This is
a task that is now on the agenda of many
researchers. In addition, researchers are
thinking of ways to come up with coherent
scenarios and incorporating them into stress
tests to improve the ability of these tests to
spot problems in the financial system. In
the interim, however, revising the disclosure
policy in the ways described above can help
mitigate the potential negative consequences
of publicly divulging the stress test results of
individual bank holding companies.

brief in brief
• The Dodd-Frank Act requires that the
Federal Reserve conduct an annual stress
test on large bank holding companies
(BHCs) to ensure they have sufficient capital
to withstand losses from adverse economic
conditions. Eighteen BHCs were subjected
to a stress test this year.
• The stress tests consider three economic
scenarios—baseline, adverse, and severely
adverse—and the results for the severely
adverse scenario are disclosed publicly by
the Federal Reserve, on the assumption that
providing more information will help impose
more discipline on financial institutions.
• However, the policy of disclosure has some
significant disadvantages. It can increase the
likelihood of a run on any bank that does not
pass the test. It can crowd out other sources
of information on banks. And it can motivate
banks to “game” the system by fixing their
balance sheets to appear financially sound
without actually being so.
• While disclosure is still a beneficial policy, it
should be revised to address these disadvantages, while the quality and precision of the
tests themselves also should be improved.
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